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Abstract—Physical-layer security is emerging as a promising
paradigm of securing wireless communications against eaves-
dropping between legitimate users, when the main link spanning
from source to destination has better propagation conditions
than the wiretap link from source to eavesdropper. In this
paper, we identify and analyze the tradeoffs between the security
and reliability of wireless communications in the presence of
eavesdropping attacks. Typically, the reliability of the main link
can be improved by increasing the source’s transmit power (or
decreasing its date rate) to reduce the outage probability, which
unfortunately increases the risk that an eavesdropper succeeds in
intercepting the source message through the wiretap link, since
the outage probability of the wiretap link also decreases when
a higher transmit power (or lower date rate) is used. We char-
acterize the security-reliability tradeoffs (SRT) of conventional
direct transmission from source to destination in the presence of
an eavesdropper, where the security and reliability are quantified
in terms of the intercept probability by an eavesdropper and the
outage probability experienced at the destination, respectively. In
order to improve the SRT, we then propose opportunistic relay
selection (ORS) and quantify the attainable SRT improvement
upon increasing the number of relays. It is shown that given the
maximum tolerable intercept probability, the outage probability
of our ORS scheme approaches zero for N → ∞, where N is
the number of relays. Conversely, given the maximum tolerable
outage probability, the intercept probability of our ORS scheme
tends to zero for N → ∞.
Index Terms—Security-reliability tradeoff, physical-layer se-
curity, opportunistic relay selection, intercept probability, outage
probability, cooperative communications.
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AT the time of writing, the Internet is typically accessedthrough the wireless infrastructure (e.g., cellular net-
works and Wi-Fi) [1]. Consequently, the security of wireless
communications plays an increasingly important role in the
cybercrime defense against unauthorized activities. Moreover,
due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, trans-
missions between legitimate users may readily be overheard
and intercepted by unauthorized parties, which makes wireless
transmission vulnerable to potential eavesdropping attacks.
As a result, wireless security has received growing research
attention in recent years. In existing wireless communication
systems, cryptographic techniques are used for preventing an
unauthorized eavesdropper from intercepting message trans-
missions between legitimate users [2], [3]. Although the
cryptographic methods indeed improve the communication
security, this comes at the expense of increased communication
and computational overheads. To be specific, the increased
complexity of encryption algorithm enhances the security level
of wireless communications, which unfortunately requires
more processing resources for encryption as well as decryption
and increases latency imposed. Furthermore, the encryption
introduces additional redundancy and hence results in an
increased overhead. Additionally, the encryption may still be
decrypted by an eavesdropper using an exhaustive key search
(also known as brute-force attack).
As an alternative, physical-layer security (PLS) is emerging
as a promising secure wireless communications paradigm
relying on exploiting the physical characteristics of wireless
channels for protection against eavesdropping attacks. The
root of PLS may be traced back to the 1970s [4], where
a discrete memoryless wiretap channel (WTC) consisting of
a single source, destination and eavesdropper is investigated
in an information-theoretic sense. It was shown that reliable
data transmission at non-zero rates may be achieved in perfect
secrecy. In [5], the authors extended Wyner’s results originally
derived for discrete memoryless WTCs to Gaussian WTCs and
quantified the secrecy capacity (SC), namely the difference
between the channel capacity of the main link (from source to
destination) and of the WTC (from source to eavesdropper). In
[6], the impact of feedback on WTCs was further investigated
in terms of their SC, showing that reliable and secure transmis-
sion is still possible, even when the main link is inferior to the
wiretap link by exploiting the feedback information. However,
the SC of wireless transmission is severely degraded by the
time-varying multipath fading effects.
To mitigate the time-varying fading, considerable efforts
have been invested in improving the SC of wireless transmis-
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sions by exploiting multiple antennas, since they enhance the
channel capacity [7], [8]. In [9], the authors studied the SC of
multiple-input single-output (MISO) WTCs. By contrast, the
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) WTC was examined
in [10], where the source (S), destination (D) and eavesdropper
(E) rely on multiple antennas and the SC is characterized by
using a generalized-singular-value-decomposition. In [11], the
authors investigated the MIMO broadcast WTC and proved
that the secrecy capacity of MIMO broadcast channels is given
by the difference between the capacities of the main and
wiretap links. As a later advance, user cooperation [12], [13]
was interpreted as a virtual MIMO formed by the cooperating
single-antenna users for achieving spatial diversity gain and
hence improves the SC of WTCs [14]-[16]. In [15], cooper-
ative jamming was advocated for improving the PLS, where
multiple users cooperate with each other by forming a coali-
tion against eavesdropping. In [16], cooperative decode-and-
forward (DF) and amplify-and-forward (AF) schemes were
conceived and it was shown that the SC can be significantly
improved by user cooperation.
In the PLS literature, E is routinely assumed to be aware
of all system parameters of the legitimate link between S
and D, including the carrier frequency, bandwidth, coding and
modulation scheme, encryption algorithm and secrecy key, etc.
Since wireless systems are standardized, the aforementioned
operating parameters (e.g., carrier frequency, bandwidth, etc.)
may be readily inferred by exploiting the weaknesses of the
protocols. In the PLS approaches of [4]-[6], the encoder of the
source is designed to maximize the data rate Rd at D and the
equivocation rate Re at E. As discussed in [17] and [18], the
idealized or perfect secrecy rate Rd is achieved, if the data rate
is as high as the equivocation rate (i.e., we have Rd = Re),
which implies that the data rate Rd is achievable at D, while
the mutual information between the transmission of S and
E becomes zero. Moreover, the SC is the highest achievable
perfectly secure rate and hence, provided that the data rate
is set below the SC, reliable transmissions between S and D
may be achieved in perfect secrecy. However, in practice, it is
challenging to devise an ideal scheme for ensuring that D can
reliably communicate with S at a non-zero rate (less than the
SC) and, at the same time, E fails to decode the source-signal
(SS).
As a result, we do not rely on the above-mentioned idealized
scheme routinely used in the PLS literature [4] - [6], [9] -
[11] and operating exactly at the SC, but rather at a lower
rate Rd for maintaining PLS. As discussed in [19], a low
intercept probability (IP) can achieved by constraining the
capacity of E. For example, when the WTC capacity is lower
than the main channel’s capacity, S may adjust its data rate
to be between the capacity of the main and that of the WTCs
for depriving E from achieving an arbitrarily low decoding
error rate, while ensuring reliable communication for D. More
specifically, according to Shannon [20], when the capacity of
the WTC spanning from S to E is lower than the data rate,
E fails to decode the SS, while the legitimate transmission
remains secure. However, if the WTC capacity becomes higher
than the data rate of D, E may succeed in decoding the SS
and hence an intercept event occurs. Although increasing the
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Fig. 1. A wireless network consists of one source (S) and one destination
(D) in the presence of an eavesdropper (E).
data rate (or decreasing the transmit power of S) may reduce
the IP and improves the level of security, this comes at the
cost of transmission reliability degradation, since the outage
probability (OP) of the main link also increases, when a higher
data rate (or lower transmit power) is used at S. Therefore,
our motivation is to strike a security versus reliability tradeoff
(SRT). Although the notion of SRT was studied in [21],
this contribution was mainly focused on the employment of
various block cipher encryption algorithms to defend against
eavesdropping attacks. By contrast, in our work PLS - rather
than block ciphering - is invoked for characterizing the SRT
performance attained in fading wireless environments.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows. Firstly, we characterize the SRT in terms of the
probability that E succeeds in intercepting the SS versus the
probability that an outage event occurs at D, respectively.
Secondly, we quantify the benefits of opportunistic relay
selection (ORS) in terms of improving the SRT, especially
upon increasing the number of relays, while ensuring that the
best relay is activated for reducing both the IP and OP.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes our system model while in Section III we propose
an ORS scheme and carry out its SRT analysis in Rayleigh
fading channels. In Section IV, we provide numerical SRT
results and show that the ORS scheme always outperforms
the conventional direct transmission, especially as the number
of relays increases. Finally, Section V presents our concluding
remarks.
II. PLS FOR WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS
A. System Model
Let us now present our system model and analyze the SRT
in Rayleigh fading channels. Consider the wireless scenario
of Fig. 1 consisting of a single S, D and E, where the
solid and dashed lines represent the S-D main link and S-
E WTC, respectively. Observe that the system model of Fig.
1 is applicable to diverse practical wireless systems, including
the family of wireless local area networks (WLANs), wireless
sensor networks (WSNs), cellular networks, mobile ad hoc
networks (MANETs) and so on. In Fig. 1, S is characterized by
its transmit power P and data rate Rd given by the Shannon-
capacity. This is in contrast to the existing trends in the PLS
literature [4]-[6] and [9]-[11], where typically an ideal scheme
operating exactly at the SC limit is assumed so that D can
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reliably communicate with S, while E fails to decode the SS.
When S transmits its signal x at a power P and rate Rd, E
may overhear the transmission of S and attempts to decode the
SS x. If E succeeds in decoding x, an intercept event occurs.
When S transmits x at a power P and rate Rd, we may express
the signal received at D as
yd =
√
Phsdx+ nd, (1)
where hsd represents the fading coefficient of the S-D chan-
nel and nd is the zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) of variance N0. Again, in line with [9]-[11], E is
assumed to know all the parameters of S. Hence, the signal
received by E is written as
ye =
√
Phsex+ ne, (2)
where hse represents the fading coefficient of the S-E channel
and ne is also a zero-mean AWGN process with a variance of
N0. According to Shannon [20], the S-D link’s capacity is
Csd = log2
(
1 + |hsd|2γ
)
, (3)
where γ = PN0 is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Similarly,
using (2), the capacity of the S-E WTC is formulated as
Cse = log2
(
1 + |hse|2γ
)
. (4)
Since both the main and the WTC are modeled as Rayleigh
fading channels, |hsd|2 and |hse|2 are exponentially distributed
random variables with means of σ2sd and σ2se, respectively.
B. Security-Reliability Tradeoff Analysis
An intercept event is encountered when the WTC capacity
becomes higher than the data rate, hence the IP Pint of direct
transmission becomes
Pint = Pr (Cse > Rd) . (5)
Substituting Cse from (4) into (5) gives the IP
Pint = Pr
(
log2(1 + |hse|2γ) > Rd
)
= Pr
(|hse|2 > α) , (6)
where α = 2
Rd−1
γ . Since |hse|2 obeys the exponential distri-
bution, the IP of (6) becomes
Pint = exp(− α
σ2se
), (7)
where again, σ2se = E
(|hse|2) is the expected value of |hse|2.
Additionally, according to Shannon [20], the OP Pout of direct
transmission from S to D is obtained as
Pout = Pr (Csd < Rd) , (8)
where Csd is given by (3). Substituting (3) into (8) yields
Pout = Pr
(
log2(1 + |hsd|2γ) < Rd
)
= 1− exp(− α
σ2sd
),
(9)
where σ2sd = E
(|hsd|2) is the expected value of |hsd|2.
Combining (7) and (9) yields
Pout = 1− (Pint)σ2se/σ2sd , (10)
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Fig. 2. A cooperative wireless network consists of one source (S), one
destination (D), and N relay nodes (RNs) in the presence of an eavesdropper
(E).
where 0 ≤ Pint ≤ 1, σ2se > 0, and σ2sd > 0. It is observed
from (10) that increasing Pint reduces Pout, again indicating
a tradeoff between security and reliability, which essentially
hinges on the average channel gains σ2se and σ2sd, but it is
independent of the transmit power P and data rate Rd. Hence,
the SRT cannot be improved by adjusting P and Rd. This
motivates the employment of ORS for the SRT improvements.
III. OPPORTUNISTIC RELAY SELECTION IN COOPERATIVE
WIRELESS NETWORKS
A. ORS Scheme
In the cooperative wireless network of Fig. 2, N RNs assist
the legitimate transmission from S to D, where the S-D direct
link is assumed to be unavailable (owing to its low quality). At
the time of writing, such a relay architecture has been adopted
in commercial wireless networks such as for example the
IEEE 802.16j/m or the long term evolution (LTE)-advanced
cellular system, where relay stations may be introduced for
assisting data transmissions between a base station and a
user terminal. An eavesdropper is located randomly around
the S and RNs. We consider the worst-case scenario, where
E overhears the transmissions of both the S and RNs and
attempts to decode the SS. We denote the set of N RNs
by R = {Ri|i = 1, 2, · · · , N}, where the DF protocol is
employed. Similar findings are valid for AF relaying protocol.
During the ORS process, S first broadcasts its signal and the N
RNs attempt to decode it. Those RNs that succeed in perfectly
decoding the source signal are represented by the successful
decoding set D. Given N RNs, there are 2N possible S-R pair
combinations from the full set R of N RNs, thus the resultant
successful decoding set D is given by
Ω = {∅,D1,D2, · · · ,Dn, · · · ,D2N−1} , (11)
where ∅ represents an empty set, while Dn is a non-empty
subset from N RNs. If the decoding set is empty, since no RN
succeeds in perfectly decoding the SS, all RNs will remain
silent. Thus, D is unable to infer the SS from the RNs. If
the successful decoding set D is non-empty, a specific RN
will be opportunistically chosen from D for forwarding its
decoded signal to D. When S transmits its signal x at a power
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P and rate Rd, the channel capacities of the S-Ri and S-E
links relying on ORS are given by
CORSsi =
1
2
log
2
(
1 + |hsi|2γ
)
, (12)
and
CORSse =
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hse|2γ
)
, (13)
where the capacity is halved, because two orthogonal time
slots are required for completing the S-D transmission via Ri.
Again, when CORSsi < Rd, the RN Ri is unable to decode the
SS x. Thus, the scenario of D = ∅ is described as
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hsi|2γ
)
< Rd, Ri ∈ R. (14)
Similarly, the event D = Dn is formulated as
1
2
log
2
(
1 + |hsi|2γ
)
> Rd, Ri ∈ Dn
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hsj |2γ
)
< Rd, Rj ∈ D¯n,
(15)
where D¯n = (R−Dn) is the complement of Dn. Given that
D is non-empty (i.e., D = Dn), a RN Ri is chosen from Dn to
forward its decoded signal xˆi to D. Since all RNs within the
decoding set D succeed in perfectly decoding the SS x, we
have xˆi = x for Ri ∈ Dn. Without loss of generality, given
that D = Dn occurs and the RN Ri ∈ Dn is selected, the
corresponding Ri-D and Ri-E channel capacities are
Cid =
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hid|2γ
)
, (16)
and
Cie =
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hie|2γ
)
, (17)
where Ri ∈ Dn. Naturally, it is wise to rely on the specific RN
having the highest channel capacity Cid, which is formulated
as
Best Relay = arg max
Ri∈Dn
Cid = argmax
i∈Dn
|hid|2. (18)
Fortunately, since the WTC is typically independent of the
main channel, no WTC capacity gain is achieved by the ORS
of (18), implying a beneficial PLS improvement.
By exploiting the ORS criterion of (18), a centralized or
distributed relay selection (RS) algorithm may be developed
[22]. To be specific, a centralized RS algorithm stores the
channel state information (CSI) of the main channels, i.e,
|hid|2. Therefore, the best relay may be readily identified
according to (18). By contrast, a distributed RS algorithm
requires each RN to maintain a timer, whose initial value is
set inverse-proportionally to |hid|2 so that the best RN’s timer
is exhausted first. Once the best RN’s timer is exhausted, it
broadcasts a control packet to notify the other network nodes.
Below, we present the SRT analysis of the proposed ORS
scheme to quantify its advantages.
B. SRT Analysis
Again, for an empty decoding set D, D is unable to decode
the SS. By contrast, if the decoding set is non-empty, a RN
will be chosen according to (18) for forwarding the SS to D.
Hence, using the law of total probability [22], we arrive at the
OP of the S-D link using the ORS scheme as
PORSout = Pr(D = ∅) +
2
N−1∑
n=1
Pr(D = Dn) Pr(CORSbd < Rd),
(19)
where CORSbd represents the channel capacity from the best RN
(denoted by Rbest) to D. From (16) and (18), CORSbd may be
expressed as
CORSbd = max
Ri∈Dn
Cid =
1
2
log2
(
1 + max
Ri∈Dn
|hid|2γ
)
. (20)
Since the |hsi|2 factors of different RNs are independent of
each other and obey the exponential distribution with a mean
of σ2si, the probability of occurrence Pr(D = ∅) for D = ∅ is
obtained from (14) as
Pr(D = ∅) =
N∏
i=1
Pr
(
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hsi|2γ
)
< Rd
)
=
N∏
i=1
Pr
(|hsi|2 < δ)
=
N∏
i=1
[
1− exp(− δ
σ2si
)
]
,
(21)
where N is the number of RNs and δ = 2
2Rd−1
γ . From (15),
the probability of occurrence Pr(D = Dn) for the event D =
Dn is given by
Pr(D = Dn) =
∏
Ri∈Dn
Pr
(
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hsi|2γ
)
> Rd
)
×
∏
Rj∈D¯n
Pr
(
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hsj |2γ
)
< Rd
)
=
∏
Ri∈Dn
Pr
(|hsi|2 > δ) ∏
j∈D¯n
Pr
(|hsj |2 < δ)
=
∏
Ri∈Dn
exp(− δ
σ2si
)
∏
Rj∈D¯n
[
1− exp(− δ
σ2sj
)
]
,
(22)
where σ2si = E(|hsi|2) and σ2sj = E(|hsj |2). Additionally, we
can obtain Pr(CORSbd < Rd) from (20) as
Pr(CORSbd < Rd) = Pr
(
max
Ri∈Dn
|hid|2 < δ
)
=
∏
Ri∈Dn
[
1− exp(− δ
σ2id
)
]
,
(23)
where σ2id = E(|hid|2). Hence, upon substituting (21)-(23)
into (19), we arrive at the closed-form OP expression of the
ORS scheme. Meanwhile, E will also attempt to decode the SS
based on its signals received from both S and the selected RN
(if any). Recall that this is in contrast to the action of D, which
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only relies on the RN, since S is out of range for D. In this
way, even when the successful decoding set is empty and no
RN forwards the SS, E might still decode the SS. Moreover,
if the successful decoding set is non-empty, E will overhear
the transmissions of both S as well as of the selected RN and
performs detection using both received signal copies. By using
the selection diversity combining, the capacity achieved by E
for D = Dn with the aid of the ORS scheme is the higher
one of Cse and Cbe, yielding
CORSe = max
(
CORSse , C
ORS
be
)
, (24)
where CORSse and CORSbe , respectively, represent the S-E and
Rbest-E capacities given by
CORSse =
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hse|2γ
)
, (25)
and
CORSbe =
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hbe|2γ
)
, (26)
where |hbe|2 represents the Rbest-E fading coefficient. Hence,
using the law of total probability, we obtain the IP at E as
PORSint =Pr(D = ∅) Pr(CORSse > Rd)
+
2
N−1∑
n=1
Pr(D = Dn) Pr(CORSe > Rd),
(27)
where Pr(D = ∅) and Pr(D = Dn) are given by (21) and
(22), respectively. Using (25), the term Pr(CORSse > Rd) is
readily obtained as
Pr(CORSse > Rd) = Pr
(|hse|2 > δ) = exp(− δ
σ2se
). (28)
Additionally, for D = Dn, we obtain Pr(CORSe > Rd) from
Appendix A as (29) at the top of the following page, where
|Dn| represents the cardinality of the set Dn, Ak is the k-
th non-empty subset of {Dn − i}, and |Ak| is the cardinality
of the set Ak. Thus, a closed-form IP expression of the ORS
scheme is derived by substituting (21), (22), (28) and (29) into
(27). So far, both the OP and IP have been derived in (19)
and (27), which characterize the SRT for the ORS scheme.
In order to further simplify the OP and IP expressions, we
now consider a special case, where the fading coefficients of
all main links (i.e., |hsd|2, |hsi|2, and |hid|2) are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables having the
same average channel gain of σ2m. This assumption is valid
in a statistical sense when all RNs are mobile and uniformly
distributed around S and D. Moreover, if the main links have
different average channel gains, we can use Eqs. (19) and (27)
to quantify the SRT of proposed ORS scheme. Similarly, the
fading coefficients of all WTCs (i.e., |hse|2 and |hie|2) are also
assumed to be i.i.d. random variables having the same average
channel gain of σ2e . Let λme = σ2m/σ2e denote the ratio of σ2m
to σ2e , which we refer to as the main-to-eavesdropper ratio
(MER) throughout this paper. Hence, considering σ2si = σ2m,
we can simplify (21) and (22) to
Pr(D = ∅) =
[
1− exp(− δ
σ2m
)
]N
. (30)
and
Pr(D = Dn) = exp(−|Dn|δ
σ2m
)
[
1− exp(− δ
σ2m
)
]|D¯n|
, (31)
where |Dn| and |D¯n| are the cardinalities of the sets Dn and
D¯n, respectively. Then, upon using σ2id = σ2m, we rewrite (23)
as
Pr(CORSbd < Rd) =
[
1− exp(− δ
σ2m
)
]|Dn|
. (32)
Substituting (30)-(32) into (19) yields
PORSout =
[
1− exp(− δ
σ2m
)
]N 1 + 2
N−1∑
n=1
exp(−|Dn|δ
σ2m
)


=
[
1− exp(− δ
σ2m
)
]N[
1 + exp(− δ
σ2m
)
]N
=
[
1− exp(− 2δ
σ2m
)
]N
.
(33)
Meanwhile, upon considering σ2se = σ2ie = σ2e , we can rewrite
(28) and (29) as
Pr(CORSse > Rd) = exp(−
δ
σ2e
), (34)
and
Pr(CORSe > Rd) = 2 exp(−
δ
σ2e
)− exp(− 2δ
σ2e
). (35)
Substituting (30), (31), (34) and (35) into (27), we arrive at
the IP as
PORSint =
[
1− exp(− δ
σ2m
)
]N
exp(− δ
σ2e
)
+
[
1−
(
1− exp(− δ
σ2m
)
)N]
×
[
2 exp(− δ
σ2e
)− exp(− 2δ
σ2e
)
]
.
(36)
Combining (33) and (36) yields
PORSint =
(
1− θ1/2
)N
θλme/2
+
[
1−
(
1− θ1/2
)N] (
2θλme/2 − θλme
)
,
(37)
where θ = 1 − (PORSout )1/N . Let us now analyze the SRT
of our ORS scheme, as the number of RNs N tends to
infinity. Observe from (30) that as N → ∞, the probability
of occurrence for the event D = ∅ tends to zero, i.e., we have
Pr(D = ∅) = 0 for N →∞. Substituting this result into (36)
gives
PORSint = 2 exp(−
δ
σ2e
)− exp(− 2δ
σ2e
), (38)
for N → ∞. Thus, letting N → ∞ and combining (33) and
(38), we arrive at
PORSint = 2
[
1− (PORSout )
1/N
]λme/2 − [1− (PORSout )1/N]λme .
(39)
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Pr(CORSe > Rd) =
∑
Ri∈Dn

1 + 2
|Dn|−1−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Ak|(1 +
∑
Rj∈Ak
σ2id
σ2jd
)−1

[exp(− δ
σ2ie
) + exp(− δ
σ2se
)− exp(− δ
σ2ie
− δ
σ2se
)
]
(29)
Observe from (39) that given a specific OP constraint 0 <
PORSout < 1, the IP PORSint of our ORS scheme asymptotically
tends to zero for N → ∞. Additionally, using (33) and (38),
we can rewrite PORSout as a function of PORSint , yielding
PORSout =
[
1−
(
1−
√
1− PORSint
)2λ−1me]N
, (40)
which shows that for an IP constraint of 0 < PORSint < 1, the OP
PORSout of our ORS scheme also tends to zero for N → ∞. In
other words, given the maximal tolerable IP, the ORS scheme
minimizes the OP as N → ∞. Conversely, as seen in (39),
given the maximal tolerable OP, the ORS scheme minimizes
the IP for N →∞. Additionally, the SRT of the ORS scheme
depends not only on the number of RNs N but also on the
average channel gains σ2si, σ2id, σ2se and σ2ie of the main links
and the WTCs. Given the maximal tolerable IP and OP, we
can directly determine the number of RNs required, provided
that the average channel gains of σ2si, σ2id, σ2se and σ2ie are
known. It has to be pointed out that the average channel
gain is typically dominated by the path loss exponent and
the transmission distance. Assuming that the eavesdroppers
are uniformly distributed around S within the coverage area,
we can determine the average S-E distance and then use the
distance to estimate the average channel gain σ2se for a specific
path-loss model. Furthermore, the average R-E channel gain
σ2ie can be similarly estimated. Moreover, the average channel
gains σ2si and σ2id of the main links may be determined by
averaging out the fading coefficients |hsi|2 and |hid|2. Once
the average channel gains of σ2si, σ2id, σ2se and σ2ie have been
obtained, we can determine the number of RNs required for
maintaining the desired SRT.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In Fig. 3, we show our numerical SRT results for both the
conventional direct transmission (DT) and the proposed ORS
schemes for different number of RNs at λme = 10dB. As
shown in Fig. 3, when the OP degrades from 10−3 to 10−1,
the IP of both schemes improves. One can also see from Fig. 3
that for a specific OP, the IP of the ORS scheme corresponding
to N = 2, N = 4 and N = 6 is strictly lower than that of
DT. This confirms that our ORS scheme performs better than
the conventional DT in terms of SRT. In contrast to Fig. 3,
Fig. 4 shows the IP versus OP of both the traditional DT and
the ORS schemes for different MERs λme associated with
N = 4. Observe from Fig. 4 that for both λme = 10dB and
λme = 12dB, the ORS scheme strictly outperforms the DT.
Fig. 5 shows the OP versus the number of RNs N of the
ORS scheme for different IP constraints associated with MER
λme = 5dB. As shown in Fig. 5, when the IP increases from
Pint = 10
−3 to Pint = 10−1, the OP of the ORS scheme is
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Direct transmission
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Fig. 3. SRT of the traditional DT and of the ORS schemes for different
number of RNs associated with an MER of λme = 10dB.
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Fig. 4. SRT of the traditional DT and of the ORS schemes for different
MERs λme with N = 4.
significantly reduced. Additionally, we can also observe from
Fig. 5 that for Pint = 10−1, Pint = 10−2 and Pint = 10−3,
the OP of the ORS scheme tends to zero, as the number of
RNs increases from N = 1 to N = 103, demonstrating the
reliability improvement upon increasing the number of RNs.
Fig. 6 shows the IP versus the number of RNs N for the
ORS scheme under different OP constraints at an MER of
λme = 5dB. Observe from Fig. 6 that as the OP increases
from Pout = 10−3 to Pout = 10−1, the IP is reduced, which
further confirms that the grade of PLS improves, as the OP
requirements are relaxed. Fig. 6 also shows that for all the
cases of Pout = 10−1, Pout = 10−2 and Pout = 10−3, the IP
of the ORS scheme decreases as the number of RNs increases
from N = 1 to N = 104. This implies that given a maximal
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Fig. 5. OP versus the number of RNs N of the ORS scheme for different
IP constraints associated with MER λme = 5dB.
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Fig. 6. IP versus the number of RNs N of the ORS scheme for different
OP constraints associated with MER λme = 5dB.
tolerable OP, the IP of the ORS scheme tends to zero, as
N →∞.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated the SRT of wireless communications
in the presence of eavesdropping attacks. We have derived the
SRT of conventional DT in the presence of an eavesdropper
over Rayleigh fading channels and shown that the IP may be
improved by relaxing the OP requirement and vice versa. Ad-
ditionally, we have quantified the benefits of ORS relying on
DF relaying in Rayleigh fading environments. Our numerical
results have shown that the ORS scheme strictly outperforms
the conventional DT scheme in terms of its SRT. Finally, as the
number of RNs increases, the SRT performance of the ORS
scheme significantly improves, demonstrating the security and
reliability benefits of relying on multiple RNs.
Here we only studied the single-source, single-destination
and single-eavesdropper scenario relying on the assistance of
multiple relays in wireless networks. In our future research we
will consider the extension of this work to a general scenario of
multi-source, multi-destination, and multi-eavesdropper situa-
tions, where cooperative beamforming may be adopted to pro-
tect the legitimate transmission against multiple eavesdroppers.
To be specific, multiple source-destination pairs can collabo-
rate with each other to form virtual antenna arrays for optimum
beamforming so that the desired signals received at legitimate
receivers experience constructive interference. By contrast, the
illegitimate eavesdroppers would be subjected to destructive
interference. Therefore, with the cooperative beamforming, the
received signal strength of legitimate receivers would be much
higher than that of the eavesdroppers, leading to a significant
wireless security enhancement.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF (29)
Using (24), we obtain the term Pr(CORSe > Rd) as
Pr(CORSe > Rd) = Pr
[
max
(
CORSse , C
ORS
be
)
> Rd
]
. (A.1)
Substituting CORSse and CORSbe from (25) and (26) into (A.1)
yields
Pr(CORSe > Rd) = 1− Pr
(|hse|2 < δ)Pr (|hbe|2 < δ) ,
(A.2)
where δ = 2
2Rd−1
γ and |hse|2 and |hbe|2 represent the fading
coefficients of the S-E and Rbest-E, respectively. Since |hse|2
is an exponentially distributed random variable with a mean
of σ2se, we have
Pr
(|hse|2 < δ) = 1− exp(− δ
σ2se
). (A.3)
Again in the ORS scheme, the best relay is determined
according to (18) and any of the RNs within the decoding
set Dn may become the best relay, provided that we have
|hid|2 > |hjd|2 for Rj ∈ {Dn − i}, in which ‘−’ represents
the difference set. Thus, using the law of total probability, the
term Pr
(|hbe|2 < δ) may be expressed as
Pr
(|hbe|2 < δ)
=
∑
Ri∈Dn
Pr
(
|hid|2 > max
Rj∈{Dn−i}
|hjd|2
)
× Pr (|hie|2 < δ) .
(A.4)
Upon assuming |hid|2 = x, we can
rewrite Pr
(
|hid|2 > max
Rj∈{Dn−i}
|hjd|2
)
as
Pr
(
max
Rj∈{Dn−i}
|hjd|2 < x
)
, which is further reformulated as
(A.5) at the top of the following page, where |Dn| represents
the cardinality of the set Dn, Ak is the k-th non-empty subset
of {Dn − i} and |Ak| represents the cardinality of the set
Ak. Additionally, considering that |hie|2 is an exponentially
distributed random variable, we have
Pr
(|hie|2 < δ) = 1− exp(− δ
σ2ie
), (A.6)
where σ2ie = E(|hie|2). Substituting (A.5) and (A.6) into (A.4)
gives (A.7) at the top of the following page. Thus, substituting
Pr
(|hse|2 < δ) and Pr (|hbe|2 < δ) from (A.3) and (A.7) into
(A.2), we easily obtain (29).
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Pr
(
max
Rj∈{Dn−i}
|hjd|2 < x
)
=
∫ ∞
0
∏
Rj∈{Dn−i}
[1− exp(− x
σ2jd
)]
1
σ2id
exp(− x
σ2id
)dx
=
∫ ∞
0
[1 +
2
|Dn|−1−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Ak| exp(−
∑
Rj∈Ak
x
σ2jd
)]
1
σ2id
exp(− x
σ2id
)dx
= 1 +
2
|Dn|−1−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Ak|
∫ ∞
0
1
σ2id
exp(− x
σ2id
−
∑
Rj∈Ak
x
σ2jd
)dx
= 1 +
2
|Dn|−1−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Ak|(1 +
∑
Rj∈Ak
σ2id
σ2jd
)−1,
(A.5)
Pr
(|hbe|2 < δ) = ∑
Ri∈Dn

1 + 2
|Dn|−1−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Ak|(1 +
∑
j∈Ak
σ2id
σ2jd
)−1

[1− exp(− δ
σ2ie
)
]
. (A.7)
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